Friday, October 15, 2010

Nazul land ,Nazul land of Ayodhya,Interpretation of H.C.Allahabad, Acts of excutive Officers

Definition of Nazul land –Satyanarain Kapoor vs State of U.P and Others the decision of the Hon'ble High Court, dated 15-10-1997 in Writ Petition No. 32605/91
                                          And (Harish Tandon vs State Of U.P. And Anr. 2006
                                             (3) AWC 2829)
           

Nazul Land


  Entry 18 of the second list of the seventh schedule to the Constitution,empowers the Government to legislate on land, i.e. rights over land, land tenure, collection of rents, transfer and alteration of agricultural land, land improvement, etc.
Government land is the land vested in the State Government. It includes nazul
Nazul land* estate land#, land acquired through ceiling$.

The State Government is empowered to dispose off the land in its possession by lease or sale as the case may be. The land revenue comprises receipts from land revenue/tax, rates and cesses on land and other receipts. All the receipts from Government land are deposited in the consolidated fund of the State.

* It is the land confiscated from the jamindars, nawabas, rajas etc. It was neither acquired nor was the cost thereof paid.

# Property which are under the management and administration of Board of Revenue is defined as estate land.

$.Land obtained through ceiling pertains to such land which has been acquired by the Government under the provisions of Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulations) Act, 1976.
The management, administration of Government land and the related activities

The management, administration of Government land and the related activitiesare governed by the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Nazul Manual, 1949 (hereinafter referred as the Nazul Manual), Government Property Management (Amendment) Rules, 2003, Uttar Pradesh Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 and the Government orders issued from time to time.

The Principal Secretary Avas, Uttar Pradesh is the administrative head of

Government land at the Government level. Chairman, Board of Revenue

(BOR) is the overall incharge of Government land and the district magistrate

(collector) of the respective district is responsible for the management and

administration of Government land.
disposal of nazul land

Under the provisions of the Nazul manual, nazul land can only be leased out.Under the provisions of rule 22 of Nazul manual, lease for nazul land shall not ordinarily be for a period shorter than 30 years in the first instance and shall, in all cases, provide for renewal after expiry of the first and subsequent terms upto a maximum period of 90 years. The granting of lease in perpetuity in respect of any nazul land on any term is prohibited. Rule 67 of Nazul Manual, read with Rule 22, prohibits granting of lease in perpetuity of nazul land. In such cases, where lease was granted in perpetuity or period of lease was not mentioned, a maximum period of 90 years can be considered for lease. Under the above provisions, the nazul land let out on lease for a stipulated period is required to be evacuated as and when the concerned lease terminates. With the introduction of the new Nazul Policy, 1998®, nazul land can be disposed off by way of sale. If any sale deed is executed, cost of land is to be recovered on the basis of market rate and stamp duty as a conveyance.

® The policy provides the guidelines to regularise the possession of

land in unauthorised occupation. But the time frame and procedure to

dispose off nazul land in custody of the Government have not been

prescribed in the policy or by any subsequent Government order.
SYED MOHD. JAVED HAMID,ZAIDI & OTHERS versus STATE OF U.P. & ANOTHER
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE OF ALLAHABAD
Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 1577 of 1999
Syed Mohd. Javed Hamid Zaidi and others Versus State of U.P. and another
***
Hon. R.K. Agrawal, J.
Hon. (Mrs.) Saroj Bala, J.
(Delivered by Hon. (Mrs.) Saroj Bala, J.)
Through this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners seek writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the order dated 3.2.1975 and the order dated 11.11.1998 (Annexures-6 and 14 to the writ petition). The petitioners further seek a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondent no. 2 to decide their application (Annexure-15 to the writ petition) and not to convert disputed Nazul land into free hold land in pursuance of Government Order No. 1562/9-11-4-92-20 of 1990.
The facts of the writ petition in brief are these:
A lease deed (Annexure-2 to the writ petition) was executed by the respondents on 20.4.1936 in favour of Abdul Aziz in relation to Nazul plot Khasra No. 1930 measuring .19 acre and .17 acre situated in Mohalla Faujpura, district Lalitpur for the purpose of construction of dwelling house. The lease deed was for a period of 90 years renewable after 30 years. Abdul Aziz real uncle of the petitioners said to have settled in Egypt. The petitioners assert that Abdul Aziz executed a Hibanama on 30.7.1947 (Annexure-3 to the writ petition) in favour of Abdul Hamid, father of the petitioners. The petitioners have stated that their father approached the Collector for mutation of his name in place of Abdul Aziz on the basis of Hibanama dated 30.7.1947 but he was advised to wait uptill the due date of renewal of lease. On 10.8.1971 the petitioner's father moved an application for renewal of lease and mutation of his name in place of Abdul Aziz. The petitioners' father approached the collector to take a final decision over the application dated 10.8.1971 but no action was taken. In the year 1974 a new district Lalitpur was carved out of district Jhansi. The petitioners' father approached the Collector district Lalitpur to take action on his application dated 10.8.1971. Another application dated 24.11.1975 (Annexuire-5 to the writ petition) for renewal of lease and mutation was made by the petitioners' father. In May 1981 the petitioners' father enquired from the office of the respondent no. 2 about the decision on his applications dated 10.8.1971 and 24.11.1975 and was informed that his application for renewal and mutation was rejected vide order dated 3.2.1975. The petitioners have challenged the order-dated 3.2.1975 on the ground that it was passed without affording an opportunity of hearing and without adhering to the rules provided in U.P. Nazul Manual. The petitioners' father moved an application on 22.5.1981 for setting aside the ex parte order dated 3.2.1975. Again an application was moved on 21.2.1983 (Annexure-8 to the writ petition) for renewal of lease and mutation. The petitioners have alleged that the respondent no. 2 did not dispose of the applications dated 22.5.1981 and 21.2.1982 during life time of their father. On 14.12.1995 the petitioners moved an application before the Governor of Uttar Pradesh for renewal of lease and conversion of Nazul land into free hold land. The respondent no. 2 had sent a notice on 7.5.1997 to the petitioner no. 1 to deposit Rs.200/- and to make an application in the prescribed proforma for conversion of Nazul land into free hold land. The petitioners made compliance of the notice dated 7.5.1997. The application of the petitioners for conversion of Nazul land into free hold land was rejected by an order dated 11.11.1998 (Annexure-14 to the writ petition). The G.O. No. 1562/9-11-4-92-29 dated 23.5.1992 having been declared ultra vires by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Satya Narain Kapoor Versus State of U.P. the petitioners were advised to wait till the decision by the Apex Court.  The operation of the judgment and order passed by this Court in the case of Satya Narain Kapoor having been stayed the petitioners  filed an application before the Governor of Uttar Pradesh for renewal of lease and mutation of their names over the disputed property. The contention of the petitioners is that two government orders   being under judicial review before the
Apex Court
, the respondents be restrained from converting the disputed Nazul land into free hold land.

The counter affidavit of Chandra Prakash, Tehsildar, Lalitpur has been filed on behalf of the respondents stating that building for residential purpose was to be constructed within 18 months in accordance with the terms, conditions and site-plan enclosed with the lease deed. The lessee Abdul Aziz having not raised constructions and having migrated to Pakistan the land in question vested in the Assistant Custodian, Jhansi under the Administration of Evacuee Property Ordinance, 1949. After the expiry of the period of first 30 years in the year 1965, the Managing Officer/Assistant Custodian, Lucknow as well Abdul Hamid applied for renewal of the lease of the disputed Nazul plots. Both the applications were rejected vide order dated 3.2.1975. The respondents have stated that Abdul Hamid did not inform the then Collector about the execution of Hibanama during the continuation of the period of lease. The contention of the respondents is that the property in dispute having been declared as evacuee property, there was no occasion for mutation of the names of the petitioners' father. According to the respondents the petitioners' father did not submit documents in support of the application as desired vide letter dated 4.11.1972 and 2.2.1973 duly received by Abdul Hamid. According to the respondents the petitioners' father having not submitted the copies of the judgments the order dated 3.12.1975 was passed on the basis of the documents available. The contention of the respondents is that the case of the petitioners was duly considered by the then Collector, Lalitpur while passing the order dated 3.2.1975. The respondents have stated that the application of the petitioners for conversion of lease hold rights into free hold rights has been rejected vide order dated 11.11.1998.
The petitioners have filed rejoinder affidavit stating that the disputed land is part of their abadi and they are in continuous possession of he said land. According to the petitioners the order dated 22.1.1952 does not relate to the property in question nor the said property was attached under the Ordinance of 1949. The petitioners have reiterated that the order dated 3.2.1975 was passed without considering the documents relating to the title and possession of the petitioners. The petitioners have denied that the disputed land is evacuee property. The petitioners allege that the applications dated 22.5.1981 and 21.2.1983 are pending disposal before the respondent no. 2.
We have heard Sri M.A. Qadeer, learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned Standing Counsel on behalf of the respondents and have perused the record of the writ petition.
The dispute relates to Nazul land forming part of plot no. 1930 situated in Mohalla Faujpura district Lalitpur. Admittedly, the said land was leased out to Abdul Aziz vide lease deed dated 20.4.1936, renewable after a period of 30 years. After partition Abdul Aziz settled in Egypt. On coming into force of the Administration of Evacuee Property Ordinance, 1949, the land in question vested in the custodian. Thirty years period of lease came to an end in April 1966. The petitioners claim right, title and interest in the disputed land on the basis of Hibanama dated 30.7.1947 said to have been executed in favour of their father by Abdul Aziz. There is no document indicating the presentation of application for renewal of lease before coming into force of Administration of Evacuee Property Ordinance, 1949 or before the expiry of the period of lease. The petitioners' father made an application for the first time on 10.8.1971 for renewal of lease and mutation on the basis of Hibanama. The lessee Abdul Aziz having left for Pakistan, the lessee rights vested in the custodian. The lease was granted to Abdul Aziz for the construction of dwelling house but no constructions were raised by him. The petitioners' father having failed to produce evidence in support of the application dated 10.8.1971 despite repeated reminders, the said application was rejected by an order dated 3.2.1975.
The terms and conditions of the lease deed dated 20.4.1936 provided "to hold the said premises upto the lessee for the terms of thirty years from the first day of December 1935 rendering therefor during the said term the yearly rent of Rs. Three only clear of all deductions. In each year at the office of the Tehsildar, Lalitpur at such other place or such Collector may from time to time appoint in this behalf the first of such payment to be made on the 1st day of December 1935 next AND the lessee doth hereby covenant with the Secretary of State that during the said term he will pay the yearly rent hereby reserved on the days and in the manner herein before appointed and also will pay and discharge all rates taxes charges and assessment of every description which are now or may at any time hereafter  be assessed charges or imposed upon the said premises or the buildings to be erected thereon or the landlord or tenant in respect thereof and also will within Eighteen Calendar months next after the date of these presents at his expenses and to the satisfaction of the Collector for the time being of Jhansi in a good substantial and workmanlike manner erect and complete on such parts of the said premises as are marked out on the plan hereto annexed a dwelling-house and out-building according to a plan and elevation to be approved by such Collector which dwelling-house and out-buildings shall be of value of the Rs. Five hundred  at least and also that no part of the external elevation or plan of such dwelling-house and out-buildings shall at any time be altered or varied from the original elevation or plan thereof without the written consent of such Collector and no other building shall be erected on the said premises without the like consent and also will at all times repair support and keep in good and substantial conditions and repair such dwelling-house and out-buildings both externally and internally and also the boundary and other walls, sewers drains rails gates fences and fixtures of or connected with the same  and will permit  the Secretary of State and his agents once in every year in the day time after twenty four hours previous notice of his or their intention so to do to enter into  upon and view the condition.
The lessee Abdul Aziz did not construct dwelling-house and out-buildings over the leased land. There is not an iota of evidence showing payment of annual rent, taxes and charges etc. by Abdul Aziz or father of petitioners immediately before or after the coming into force of the Administration of Evacuee Property Ordinance, 1949. Under the lease deed there was consent that Secretary of State may re-enter the premises in case of breach of any of the terms and conditions. The request for renewal of lease was to be made not less than six months before the end of 30 years. The petitioners' father did not make a request for renewal six months before the expiry of period of 30 years. Such request was made five years after the expiry of period of 30 years. The original lessee having committed the breach of the terms and conditions of lease the lease stood determined and the Secretary of State re-entered into the premises and the application for renewal of lease moved by the Managing Officer and the petitioners have rightly been rejected.
Apropos to what has been stated above, we do not find any substance in the writ petition. We, accordingly, dismiss the writ petition with no order as to costs.
D/-31.3.2006

Revenue Records
                         The entire land in Ayodhya is "nazul land", that is, State land administered by local bodies which allot them to parties for a specific period after obtaining premium of the land. It is the nazul map of 1931 which has been cited in the case with the plot numbers as shown in the State land revenue records. But the government's notification of 1991 deliberately cited plot numbers from settlement maps of 1961 and 1937 - plots 159 (part), 160, 171 (part) and 172 (part). This created confusion. For instance, plot No.160 cited in the notification incorporated five plots of nazul land including plot No. 586 (as per revenue records) on which the shilanyas was held in 1989.
The mosque itself is on nazul plot no. 583 and falls in revenue plot nos. 146, 158 and 160. Nine of the 23 disputed plots of which the court is seized fall within the four revenue plots acquired by the government.
The High Court's judgment of December 11, 1992, exposed the fraud behind the lease. Justice Verma's obiter gave the VHP some hope. The terms of the lease, read with the High Court's judgment, should dispel all misconception about the so-called "undisputed" character of the adjacent land. The deed of March 20, 1992, should be formally cancelled. If the government will not, the courts should.
The grant, moreover, was part of a larger transaction which was struck down as void in a unanimous judgment of three Judges of the Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad High Court, delivered on December 11, 1992, on the acquisition of the land in 1991. This forgotten ruling has acquired great relevance today for its thorough exposure of the entire web of deceit. The Judges commented also on the deed of lease.
Frontline -Volume 19 - Issue 09, Apr. 27 - May 10, 2002-A.G. NOORANI

AYODHYA

A deceitful, invalid claim

The Ramjanmabhoomi Nyas and the Vishwa Hindu Parishad claim, on the basis of a March 1992 lease deed, that they own the land adjacent to the site of the Babri Masjid. When the terms of the lease deed have been brazenly violated, the violators have no claim to its restoration. In fact, any citizen can now move the court for the cancellation of the lease.
A.G. NOORANI
THE terms and conditions of the lease deed of March 20, 1992, knock the bottom out of the case of the Ramjanmabhoomi Nyas (RJN) and the VHP that they owned the land adjacent to the site of the demolished Babri mosque. The claim was based on deliberate falsehood. It had far-reaching consequences because of its uncritical acceptance. The majority judgment of the Supreme Court in the Ayodhya case, delivered by Justice J.S. Verma, said: "The interest claimed by the Muslims is only over the disputed site where the mosque stood before its demolition. The objection of the Hindus to this claim has to be adjudicated. The remaining property acquired under the Act (The Acquisition of Certain Area at Ayodhya Act, 1993) is such over which no title is claimed by the Muslims. A large part thereof comprises of properties of Hindus of which the title is not even in dispute" (Ismail Faruqui vs. Union of India (1994) six Supreme Court Cases 360, on page 407). He spoke of the "rights of ownership of Hindu owners of the adjacent properties" and asserted: "The adjacent area in respect of which there is no dispute of title and which belongs to Hindus" (page 411).
This was pure obiter and ipse dixit. There was no occasion or need for Justice Verma to say all that. He had absolutely no material before him in its support, but, much in the government's White Paper, which he cited, to the contrary. The VHP cashed in on his remarks and mounted a campaign for the return of the adjacent land even after the crime of December 6, 1992, was perpetrated. It was based on two propositions - the adjacent land belonged to the RJN before the acquisition and its restoration to it and to the VHP, which runs the RJN, will not prejudice the litigation concerning the site. In all 67.703 acres of land was acquired under the Act. The RJN-VHP claim return of 43 acres. The lease deed exposes both propositions to be false. The 43 acres belonged to the State of Uttar Pradesh. It was given on lease to the RJN for specific purposes only. Construction of a temple was not among them; in fact, it conflicted with them. Besides, the RJN-VHP took the land on false pretences. The object in 1992 was to build a temple on the site of the mosque. That is also the object for which its return is being sought now.

A facsimile of the sketch map of the property in dispute.
BJP president Jana Krishnamurthy claims: "The actual dispute is over 80 ft by 40 ft where the structure known as Babri Masjid was located (and) the rest of the land is not in the disputed site. This land was bought (sic.) by the VHP and the Ramjanmabhoomi Nyas... there is some basis for the demand" (The Indian Express, February 6, 2002). Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee's statement in Parliament on March 14 belied that: "The Nyas is a permanent lessee of 42 out of 67 acres of this acquired land, adjacent to the disputed site in Ayodhya. It is also the owner of an additional 1 acre out of this acquired undisputed (sic.) land." Why he omitted to mention the conditions of the lease is for him to explain.
The terms of the lease blow sky-high the claim that the land is "undisputed". It was state-owned land, public property in which all citizens have an interest - Muslims included. The terms of the lease were violated, brazenly. The entire transaction was deceitful. Any citizen can move the court now for cancellation of the lease. The violators have no claim to its restoration - in order to commit further breaches.
The object of the lease was "the development as Shree Ram Katha Park for the purpose of tourism development by Government of Uttar Pradesh... The lessee has proposed to implement this project on behalf of 'Shree Ramjanmabhoomi Nyas' using its own resources. Upon which - (that is, on the basis of this representation and for this object) - it has been decided by the Government of Uttar Pradesh that the aforesaid land be given to 'Shree Ramjanmabhoomi Nyas' to implement this project of Shree Ram Katha Park..."
Clause 3 of the deed binds the lessee "to implement" that project. Clause 4 empowers the lessor, the State government, "to enter" the land for inspection - as its owner. The deed explicitly says that the land is demised under the Government Grants Act, 1895. This law was enacted to deprive lessees of state land from the protection which the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 confers on lessees. It makes grants unilateral transfers by the state terminable at will if their terms are violated. The lessee is in fact a grantee.
Deceit is written all over the transaction. The grant was given by the BJP government of Kalyan Singh. The grantee, the RJN, had no interest in the Park as such; its declared object was construction of the temple. It was not a public purpose, but a favour to one side in a litigation. It is void on this ground alone (H.M. Seervai; Constitutional Law of India; Fourth edition; Vol. I; page 933).
The grant, moreover, was part of a larger transaction which was struck down as void in a unanimous judgment of three Judges of the Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad High Court, delivered on December 11, 1992, on the acquisition of the land in 1991. This forgotten ruling has acquired great relevance today for its thorough exposure of the entire web of deceit. The Judges commented also on the deed of lease.
Justice S.C. Mathur's judgment recorded the basic facts. The RJN's Trust Deed was executed on December 18, 1985: "The first object of the trust is to reconstruct the temple of Sri Ram at Sri Ram Janmabhoomi and the beautification of the spot all around. Rest of the objects are connected with the reconstruction of the temple and re-installation of deities. From this it would follow that the trust is a religious one.... The association of the trustees with the Vishwa Hindu Parishad and Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh has also not been disputed."
The 1991 acquisition had a background. Some 55.674 acres of land, well beyond the Babri mosque, were acquired on January 20 and 23, 1989, and on September 27, 1989, for laying out a Ram Katha Park.
The objects of this acquisition were to use the Park "to create experience (sic.) of the cultural aspect emerging from the great epic Ramayana... The park should be integrated with the overall development of Ayodhya... in order to have wider appeal and to uphold secular ideas, the emphasis should lie on philosophic and on the unique aspect of Rama's life rather than on the ritualistic aspect."
It was designed to take the steam out of the VHP's campaign. When the BJP came to power in Uttar Pradesh on June 24, 1991, it latched on to it and perverted it to its own ends. Construction of a Ram temple was promised in the Governor's address to the State Assembly on July 31, 1991. On October 7, 1991, 2.77 acres of land around the mosque were acquired by the government dishonestly - "for the development of tourism and providing amenities to pilgrims at Ayodhya." When this acquisition was challenged in court, the BJP government, in an affidavit dated January 3, 1992, asserted in categorical terms: "No plan for development of Ram Katha Park could be completed without Shri Ram Janmabhoomi Sthal (the site and adjacent land) being included into it, as the Ram Katha Park was designed to be built around Shri Ram Janmabhoomi. With this end in view, the State government has further acquired... 2.77 acres of land of Ram Janmabhoomi Sthal so that an integrated plan can be prepared.... A part of the land of Shri Ram Janmabhoomi will be left vacant for the renovation and reconstruction of Bhagwan Shri Ram Virajman there" (the idols of Ram planted in the mosque in December 1949).
It was the lands thus acquired that were given on lease to the RJN on March 20, 1992. Justice S.C. Mathur remarked: "It is apparent that the land of Ram Katha Park and the present land are to be used for one and the same purpose. The land of Ram Katha Park has already been handed over to a trust whose aims and objects are religious and whose trust board is dominated by members of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad." Thus, the acquisition of land in October 1991 and the transfer by lease in March 1992 were part of the same transaction and had the same object - construction of the temple. Justice Mathur's remarks on the trust as a VHP body are significant. He held the acquisition in 1991 to be "camouflaged... in order to give advantage to Hindus in the litigation". He struck down the notification of October 7, 1991, as void. The other two Judges on the Bench fully concurred. The lease cannot survive the striking down of the acquisition.
Justice Brijesh Mathur noted that the acquisition was linked to the proposed temple and said "the only proper thing would have been to wait until the rights of the parties are settled as regards the title of the property." This advice is very relevant now.
Justice S.H.A. Raza recorded the petitioners' contention that the graveyard adjoining the mosque, and the mosque, are "inseparably attached to the religious practice of the Muslims". The Namaze Janaaza (funeral prayer) is said at the mosque before the burial in the graveyard which was waqf (trust) property. Muslims had a clear legal interest in the "adjacent land". He referred to the site-plan filed in the old case in 1885 which "shows the graves over all the four sides facing the outer boundary of the shrine".
The entire land in Ayodhya is "nazul land", that is, State land administered by local bodies which allot them to parties for a specific period after obtaining premium of the land. It is the nazul map of 1931 which has been cited in the case with the plot numbers as shown in the State land revenue records. But the government's notification of 1991 deliberately cited plot numbers from settlement maps of 1961 and 1937 - plots 159 (part), 160, 171 (part) and 172 (part). This created confusion. For instance, plot No.160 cited in the notification incorporated five plots of nazul land including plot No. 586 (as per revenue records) on which the shilanyas was held in 1989.
The mosque itself is on nazul plot no. 583 and falls in revenue plot nos. 146, 158 and 160. Nine of the 23 disputed plots of which the court is seized fall within the four revenue plots acquired by the government. More than half of the disputed area, including the shilanyas site, has been acquired. A jubilant general secretary of the VHP, Ashok Singhal, summed up the result for all to see on October 14, 1991 - only a mere 3,200 square feet near the mosque itself has been excluded. But included in the acquisition were the famous Ram Chabootra, within the compound of the mosque, the Sumitra Bhavan, the Sankat Mochan Mandir and the Sakshi Gopal Mandir. The RJN destroyed 16 temples.
The High Court's judgment of December 11, 1992, exposed the fraud behind the lease. Justice Verma's obiter gave the VHP some hope. The terms of the lease, read with the High Court's judgment, should dispel all misconception about the so-called "undisputed" character of the adjacent land. The deed of March 20, 1992, should be formally cancelled. If the government will not, the courts should.
However, the incontrovertible position is that the land now vests in the State of U.P. and the RJN-VHP claim to its return to them rests on the lease deed. That document is based on fraud. Its terms were broken, anyway. It cannot be acted on or enforced.
Even if the acquisition is denotified, the 43 acres should not revert to the RJN-VHP, for two reasons: the lease deed itself was a fraudulent one and the lessees violated it recently. Now nothing survives of the lease. It is state land to be used only for a public purpose; as citizens Muslims have a legal interest in the public purpose for which the land will be used hereafter.



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